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SPECIAL SECURITY INDOCTRINATION TALK

A simplified definition of the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency is that it collects, evaluates and disseminates intelligence relating to the national security. In the course of carrying out this mission CIA is the recipient of information from a great number of sources and this information after evaluation is of the broadest strategic importance to the welfare of the United States. To appreciate the type of information daily coming into the possession of this Agency it is well that we define intelligence. There are many kinds of intelligence: military, economic, sociological, political, agricultural, industrial, etc. However, as concerns the basic mission of this Agency intelligence might well be defined as integrated information from all the broad fields of human endeavor having an effect on our national security and particularly including all facets of a foreign nation's military and politico-economic capabilities and intentions. The scope of this definition is such as to include practically anything that is happening today in the world. To work with such a concept it is necessary to divide it into factors capable of being concretely realized and dealt with. By common agreement with the other intelligence organizations five categories of intelligence information are recognized, namely:

BASIC INTELLIGENCE

Basic intelligence is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result

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of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Current intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

STAFF INTELLIGENCE

Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities.

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE

Departmental intelligence is that intelligence including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency of the Federal Government, and the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

National intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment.

In order to estimate the capabilities and intentions of foreign governments it is necessary that information be developed from every possible source both foreign and domestic. Of outstanding importance is the exploitation of recorded information including books, periodicals, magazines and newspapers, also professional journals covering such fields as science, medicine and economics. Public utterances of private individuals and government officials are a fertile field. The radio is an important source of information. Valuable information is also obtained by representatives of this government talking with individuals from every walk of life who may be in a position to give information of importance.

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In short, the collection of intelligence information requires the utilization of all available sources of information abroad, and the exploitation within the United States of domestic sources of foreign intelligence.

Vast effort and considerable money is spent to exploit sources of information. To protect these sources and to permit the continued opening of new sources it is necessary that adequate security measures be created and applied. A guarantee that information will be properly protected and its source thus safeguarded insures the continuity of the collection effort. On the other hand exposure of sources places our informants in jeopardy and causes these sources to immediately dry up.

Having collected information it is necessary that it be evaluated. Evaluation requires a staff of officers thoroughly experienced in specialized fields of knowledge. The raw mass of collected information must be analyzed and an accurate synthesis developed. Evaluation demands knowledge and judgment; it requires long years of training in a specialty together with a broad grasp of underlying social and political factors.

Having collected and evaluated information it is necessary to place the finished product in the hands of those key people in our government who may utilize this information in implementing present policies or in formulating new policies. Dissemination of CIA's finished product must be in strict conformity with security rules and regulations in order that this information will be protected and our interests and targets will be safeguarded from disclosure. It is necessary that individuals receiving our finished intelligence be persons of integrity and who are loyal beyond question to this government, and that there be available

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adequate physical facilities and control methods to protect our material.

In protecting sources of information there are two basic dangers within this Agency to be considered: (1) the penetration of this Agency by foreign agents and (2) the compromise of intelligence information through careless handling or loose talk by our personnel.

We are meeting the danger of careless handling or loose talk through a program of security indoctrination, security surveys and inspections, and the establishment of internal controls for the handling, transmission and storage of classified information. While much can be done through applying these controls there is a margin of human error which cannot be offset solely by the application of controls. This small margin, however, can be eradicated by a continuing awareness of each and every individual within the Agency of the necessity of making security a habit.

The greatest danger to the security of our information and operations lies in the efforts by foreign principals to penetrate our operations. Penetration may be accomplished directly by the insinuation of agents or it may be done indirectly by utilizing disaffected personnel. Penetration efforts by a foreign principal are hard to detect as the compromise of information is not apparent and an actual penetration may exist for years without any outward appearance which would indicate that our information is being clandestinely utilized by a foreign power. The combating of penetrations is an important and difficult mission of Inspection and Security. A thorough security investigation of all personnel is a basic countermeasure. Later on in this talk the general functions and organization of the Office of Inspection and Security will be described in order that you may be made aware of our facilities and particularly our limitations in this type of work.

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As concerns foreign principals penetrating this Agency we have only one major antagonist, namely Soviet Russia and her International Communist Parties. We must, though, be aware of efforts by foreign principals of nations other than the USSR. However, it is believed that activities of other foreign nations are limited in comparison with the all out efforts the Soviets are making. A penetration attempt by the Soviets always represents a well organized effort and one in which many resources are brought to bear. The espionage system of the Soviets has an advantage in that it operates outside of the law, with complete freedom of action and is restricted only by the factor of possible detection and exposure. On the other hand we in security work of this Agency must function within laws and regulations which clearly define the limits of our counterefforts. Our responsibility requires that we conform with and uphold the laws and regulations of this government; whereas, the efforts of Soviet principals are not restricted by any laws, regulations or even ethics.

The Soviets have an additional advantage in that they can utilize the members of Communist Parties in other lands to perform espionage services against their own national governments. In this country the Soviets can exploit hundreds of American citizens and nationals of other countries and use every conceivable cover or guise to penetrate our channels of information. This we all recognize but perhaps not all of us understand the scope of the intricate pattern under which the Soviet espionage system operates. In the first place, all direction of an overall penetration attack upon our operations is closely directed from Moscow. Orders are carried out by a number of separate parallel services each with its own network of agents and each operating secretly from the

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other. The focal point of operations in this country is the Soviet Embassy; under its diplomatic immunity the Soviet Embassy can direct a concentration of effort. Orders to carry out such a penetration would rarely be handled directly from the Embassy but would pass through the hands of intermediaries or cutouts, each carefully protected, until finally the individual serving as the penetration vehicle receives his orders. To achieve this elaborate cover the Soviets work through key contacts with the Communist Party, USA, who in turn work through party members, fellow travelers, and ideological tools who may be readily exploited and brought within the operating network pattern. An important part of Soviet espionage recruitment in this country is the utilization of United States citizens who are members of the Party and who by experience and faithful adherence to Party orders have proved themselves as being satisfactory subjects for assignment to the Communist underground. Such individuals are generally removed from the control of the American Communist Party and placed directly under the control of the Embassy. Members who are recruited into the underground are particularly persons who have not been openly associated with the Communist cause and on the surface at least are to all intents and purposes loyal American citizens. However, being well trained in an atmosphere of conspiracy they are able to operate very effectively.

While we are discussing Soviet espionage activities it might be well to mention some of the information disclosed as a result of the Gouzenko espionage hearing in Canada. The Canadian Royal Commission investigating the Gouzenko disclosures found the existence of several well established espionage systems in Canada. Gouzenko himself said "You may have discovered 15 men but it still leaves in Canada this dangerous

situation because there are other societies and other people working under every Embassy, under every Consul in each place where there is a Consulate. It is just like a number of small circles. There are parallel systems of spies or potential agents " Gouzenko also testified that there was a 5 man committee in Moscow passing on Soviet officials who were being sent to foreign countries. This committee consisted of representatives of the NKVD (the secret police, now known as the MVD), the Military Intelligence, the Naval Service, the Commercial Service and the Diplomatic Service. While Gouzenko's testimony was given on conditions as they existed in Canada he also made the statement that "The same thing was true in the United States, according to a telegram I saw". On this testimony therefore, we can only assume that in the United States today there are at least five separate Soviet espionage systems.

The establishment of a penetration within our Agency would be the simplest and most effective method of obtaining information about our operations and activities. The stealing of documents or forcible entry into CIA premises is highly susceptible to detection. Such a means is not only crude but it is in general a one-time operation. On the other hand what could be more effective than to draw into the Soviet network a highly trusted and reputable American official having access to our principle sources of information. Then by using cutouts and couriers, classified information could be relayed to the Soviet Embassy with slight risk of detection. Such a penetration completely offsets the work of hundreds of government employees and is a simple operation once established. The utilization of an employee for penetration purposes may

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be founded on the basis that he or she has been a Communist Party member for years and has effectively concealed membership; or it may be an employee who is a Communist sympathizer and who has ideologically reached the state of mind where he can rationalize his disloyalty to this country by reasoning that his loyalty to a world movement takes precedence. Several instances of the latter kind were revealed in the Report on the Canadian espionage case. This Report states that, "Many of the Canadian public servants implicated in this espionage network were persons with an unusually high degree of education, and many were well regarded by those who worked with them in agencies and departments of the public service, as persons of marked ability and intelligence. E. g. Raymond Boyer, PHD, a member of the staff of McGill University and a valued senior worker with the National Research Council, is a highly respected scientist with an international reputation in chemistry. He is a man of very substantial independent means". Still quoting from this report the Commission said "There is no evidence that monetary incentive played an important part in the original motivation of those persons whose ideology was sympathetic to the Communist cause, who agreed to act as espionage agents. On the contrary the evidence is overwhelming that their original motivation was a product of their political ideology and of the psychological conditioning received....."

The Soviets, however, would never permit this arrangement to be continued solely on the ideological fervor of the individual but would finally bind the agent hand and foot by requiring him to submit reports in his own handwriting, or over his own signature or to accept money. Such outright commitment by the individual would enable the Soviets to

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retain complete control in the event he should change his viewpoint. A person serving as a penetration agent would ordinarily not indicate strong feelings either for or against the Soviet regime. His general approach would be that of the humanitarian internationalist always supporting American principles sufficient to establish himself in the minds of his coworkers as a loyal American citizen. In carrying out his espionage activities the penetration agent would provide written information in the form of copies of reports, or would take notes of important documents or would even memorize important information to be recorded at a later date.

The indirect penetration based on disaffecting an employee would be accomplished generally through playing on weaknesses such as questionable morals, lack of discretion, or financial difficulties. Pressure would be applied by loan of money or by threatening to expose indiscretions and immoral activities. Such a penetration is limited by time because at the first opportunity the unwilling recruit would break with his principals. However, for a time this arrangement can be very productive from the standpoint of espionage. From the viewpoint of security requirements, therefore, it is necessary that we examine carefully the background of all applicants for employment with this Agency. Exploitable weaknesses are a security risk which this Agency cannot afford to take.

Any inclination for us to believe that penetration efforts as described, exist only in the realm of fiction must have been dissipated by the testimony of the Gouzenko case in Canada. And coming closer to home, we all know based upon newspaper reports of the hearings before the House of Un-American Activities Committee that there existed in this

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government during wartime a well organized Soviet espionage network. To believe that the Soviets have relaxed any of their efforts in conducting espionage activities against this government is contrary to the evidence plainly before us.

To afford maximum security protection to this Agency, its operations and its sources of information, it is necessary that the Office of Inspection and Security secure the cooperation and wholehearted support of each and every employee. I & S not only welcomes but solicits inquiries from anyone within the Agency regarding advice on security matters. Also the work of I & S will be aided if individuals within the Agency bring to our attention any matters, no matter how trivial, that arouse suspicion or concerning which it is deemed that further inquiry might be made. To enlist your cooperation regarding security matters it is believed it would be helpful to give a short description of the various functions now being carried on by the branches and divisions of I & S.

As you are aware, the fundamental mission of the Executive for Inspection and Security is to create and apply security control measures designed to insure the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations of CIA against espionage, sabotage and subversive activities of foreign powers and disaffected or dissident groups or individuals. To carry out this mission the office is divided into three branches: The Security Branch, Employee Investigative Branch and the Inspection and Audit Branch. The Security Branch has two divisions, namely, the Personnel Security Division and the Physical Security Division. The Personnel Security Division is concerned with the security clearance of all personnel assigned to and on duty with CIA. In carrying out this function

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it carefully analyzes investigative reports and based upon considered judgement and within the principles established by the Director makes recommendation as to whether or not an individual is a suitable person for employment by this Agency. It should be stated that the evaluation of investigative reports calls for considerable experience, and the best interests of the U. S. Government must be carefully weighed. The Physical Security Division establishes security controls over all CIA offices and buildings, conducts the security indoctrination of personnel, maintains pass and visitor controls, and establishes security regulations for the handling, transmission and storage of classified information. The Security Branch is further supplemented by the Security Control Staff which in cooperation with other government agencies develops uniform security control policies and practices on matters of mutual concern. Furthermore, the Security Control Staff prepares overall security control policies for the collection and dissemination of intelligence materials; it also serves to establish security policy concerning specific projects as they occur in the development of the intelligence operation.

The Employee Investigative Branch has recently been established. This Branch conducts field investigations of employees and applicants for employment. It develops to the best of its ability all information both written and oral concerning the special capabilities and character of individuals in which this Agency has an employee interest. A distinct line is drawn between the function of this Branch and the function of the Security Branch. The Employee Investigative Branch is a fact finding agency.

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It does not judge or evaluate its own reports but the reports are turned over to the Personnel Security Division for independent analysis and recommendation. In order to best serve the security interests of this Agency it is necessary that the Employee Investigative Branch have at its command all possible sources of personnel security information which might be utilized in developing information concerning applicants or employees. Security information is never static and every day new sources and new information are developed by the various government agencies. Effective liaison must be established with all such agencies in order that as this information is produced we are advised by our counterparts in other agencies. This information is sometimes of immediate value but more often is of future value. Personnel security investigations, once having been conducted, cannot be considered as affording clearance for all future operations. To maintain adequate personnel control, all cases must be periodically re-opened and rechecked against current information. No operation of this Agency can be effectively carried out unless the personnel are loyal. One disaffected or subverted employee can destroy the work of hundreds of others and do irremediable damage to the national security. It is the rare case indeed that any single event or incident in the history of an employee constitutes an action which clearly establishes that employee as disloyal or a security risk. To the contrary it is generally a minor incident which brought to the attention of the security organization establishes a security question as concerns that employee and which when investigated and developed in the light of the incident may establish a pattern of events which reveals the person to be disloyal or a bad security risk. It might be mentioned in passing that the controls exercised by

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I & S over personnel may seem time consuming to those operating offices who have requested recruitment actions to relieve the workload. Every effort is made by I & S to expedite security clearances but in the best interests of the Agency it would be poor economy and security to pass an unchecked applicant who later on because of developed information may be a security risk.

The Inspection and Audit Branch consists of an Audit Division and an Inspection Division. The Audit Division carefully reviews expenditures of funds and in general follows auditing practices as carried out in any private corporation, with the added responsibility of determining that disbursements are made in accordance with appropriate governmental and agency rules, regulations and orders. The Inspection Division conducts inspections to ascertain the manner in which intelligence activities are being carried out, and as ordered by the Director conducts inspections and investigations concerning the economy and efficiency of service and support.

In summation, we all recognize that ideological ideas are loose in the world today which are a direct threat to the continuance of our American theories of democracy. The intelligence reports prepared by this Agency have direct bearing on the present and future security of the United States. These reports are the end product of the work of many hundreds of people and the expenditure of millions of dollars. The Office of the Executive for Inspection and Security is a service organization; its only reason for being is to preserve the integrity of this Agency by guarding its sources and methods of operations. It can be said with surety that the CIA today is the number one target of foreign intelligence

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agencies, particularly the Soviets. To be of greatest service to the Agency I & S needs the wholehearted support and cooperation of each and every individual in the Agency.

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